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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WOODLAND THEATRES, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)

Case No, 14440

)

Case No. 14441

vs.
ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES,
INC., a corporation, and
PLITT INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES,
INC., a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The plaintiff-appellant has not followed the
requirements of Rule 75 (p) (2) with respect to the matters
to be included in the appellant's brief, but, in an apparent
attempt to create the appearance of factual disputes, (even
though this appeal involves but two clear-cut legal issues)
has combined elements of fact and argument in the various
introductory statements in the first ten pages of its brief.
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The defendant-respondent does not agree with these statements because they improperly attempt to create the atmosphere
of a factual issue and purport to state as matters of fact,
arguments and contentions of counsel which are not facts
supported in the record.

For convenience, the plaintiff-

appellant will be referred to in this brief as "plaintiff"
and the defendant-respondent will be referred to as "defendant".
Nature of the Case
This appeal involves two cases, consolidated in the
court below and here, seeking to forfeit a lease of a drive-in
theatre, seeking damages, and seeking under the unlawful
detainer statute repossession of the premises, all for alleged
breaches of the lease.
to this Court:

Two clear-cut legal issues are presented

whether the plaintiff, by acceptance of rent

with knowledge of the alleged breaches, waived these breaches,
and a subordinate issue of whether the defendant had an obligation to maximize profits.
Disposition of the Case
in the Lower Court
Based on alleged breaches of a lease of a drive-in
theatre owned by plaintiff, plaintiff sought to forfeit the
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lease and recover alleged damages.

Plaintiff filed, in the

Summer of 1974, two separate actions, one under the Utah
Unlawful Detainer Statute, Section 78-36-3 et seq., Utah
Code Annotated (1953), Civil No. 221688, and the second under
a complaint entitled "Complaint for Breach of Lease and
Termination of Lease11, Civil No, 222497,
The lease violations alleged in the first case
were essentially the same as those in the second, with the
difference that in the second there were alleged some additional breaches not raised in the unlawful detainer action.
More than one year after filing of the complaint and after
extensive discovery, the defendant filed motions for summary
judgment in both actions, based upon the ground that even
if it is assumed that plaintiff's allegations of lease violations were well taken, by the acceptance of rent with
knowledge of such breaches, plaintiff, as a matter of law,
had waived the breaches and that, contrary to plaintiff's
allegations, defendant had no duty under the lease to
maximize revenues from the leased premises.
The motions for summary judgment were heard by
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow on December 12, 1975 and
both sides presented their arguments through written memoranda
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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submitted prior to hearing and by extensive oral argument.
After further deliberation, the trial court granted summary
judgment for respondent in both cases on December 24, 1975.
The plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing which presented
no new material not previously considered by the court and
the motion, after hearing, was denied.
Facts
Where, as in this case, there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact, Rule 56 directs that a summary

While it is not of major significance, the persistent overreaching of the plaintiff in its brief, is some
indication of the weakness of its position. In addition to
those factual inaccuracies noted below, the plaintiff, by
stating that the motion for summary judgment was made on
December 12, 1975 (p. 2) and was heard and ruled on on December
12, 1975 (p, 4) appears to suggest that the motion was not
fully considered below. Quite the contrary is true. The
plaintiff filed its complaint in the Summer of 1974. The
motion for summary judgment was filed well over a year later
on November 20, 1975, together with a memorandum in support
thereof, after fairly extensive discovery. It was heard by
the court on December 12, 1975. Plaintiff did not file its
memorandum until December 11, 1975, the day before the hearing, The court took the matter under advisement and entered
judgment on December 24, 1975, (See dates on various pleadings in the record and also the Summary Judgment, R. 90,
Vol. I, 342 Vol, 2 ) ,
Note. The record in this case is in two volumes,
apparently because there are two consolidated cases. The
record in district court numbered 2211688 will be referred
to as Volume 1 and the record in district court numbered
222497 (the second case filed by plaintiff) will be referred
to as Volume 2.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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judgment shall be granted.

The plaintiff here has followed

the traditional tactic of a party resisting summary judgment
where his legal position is untenable, by attempting to create
the atmosphere of a factual dispute in order to avoid the
clear mandate of Rule 56. Moreover, plaintiff's statement
of facts itself contains gross overstatements in a patent
attempt to shock the court and create an atmosphere of bad
faith on the part of defendant.^

On this appeal, however,

z

For example, the plaintiff refers (p. 7 of appellant's brief) to the fence being "weathered and unpaintedM
but fails to state that there is absolutely no reference to
this in the record, fails to state that it is a grape stake
fence that is intended to have a natural weathered appearance,
is not intended to be painted and has never been painted and
was not painted when the plaintiff leased the theatre to defendant. Nor does plaintiff even allude to the fact that the fence
in many parts is worn out and can no longer be repaired but
should be replaced and under case law it is the landlord*s and
not the tenant*s responsibility to replace worn out parts of
the premises. See e.g., Paul v. Paul*s Liquor Store Co.,
217 A2d 197 (Del. 1966); Presbyterian Distributing Service v.
Darling, 166 A2d 308 (Pa, 1960); Maggio v. Cox, 63 So.2d 167
(La. 1953). Another example is that plaintiff constantly
states that ABC "assigned the lease" when in fact there is
not one item in the record showing any assignment. The only
item in the record is that the stock of ABC Intermountain
Theatres, Inc. was sold to a new stockholder and the corporate
name was changed to Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc. (Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories 9 and 10, R. 100-105; 127129, Vol. 2). Plaintiff attempts to create the atmosphere
that there are two separate corporations when in fact there
is but one and plaintiff has never effected service of process
on any but one corporate entity, Other examples of plaintiff's
overstatements to the extent that they may be of assistance
in the argument will be referred to in the argument.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the exact nature or extent of the alleged breaches is
irrelevant.

Needless to say, defendant denies these claims

of the plaintiff, along with any other claims of wrong doing
on its part, and has affirmatively shown in the record
(Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories 9-10, R. 100-105;
127-129, Vol. 2) the expenditures of very substantial sums
of money by it in an effort to satisfy a difficult landlord
and make certain that it had cured within the grace period
given in the lease, even the tenuous claims of the landlord.
However, for purposes of the present appeal, all of the allegations of breach which are actually made by appellant in its
complaint (but not the exaggerations of those allegations
made by counsel in his brief) must be accepted as true and
there is, therefore, no genuine issue concerning them.
There are some facts, however, which plaintiff has
omitted, which are material to the lower court's disposition
of this matter - namely, certain admissions by the plaintiff
that it did accept rent after knowledge of the alleged breaches.
It will be helpful to include these admissions for reference
in this brief and also to set out a more accurate description
of the allegations made by the plaintiff.

- 6 -
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As stated in plaintiff's statement of facts, the
plaintiff, Woodland Theatres, Inc., entered into a lease with
the defendant, which was then known as ABC Intermountain
Theatres, Inc., providing for the lease of the Woodland
3
Drive-In Theatre premises for a term of fifteen years.

The

lease provided for the payment of a minimum annual guaranteed
rental of $32,500.00 (payable in 12 monthly installments of
$2,708.33 each) against a percentage rental based on a percent
of gross receipts.
The plaintiff's unlawful detainer action was filed
in August of 1974 and all of the alleged violations of the lease
referred to in that action occurred prior to June 26, 1974.
(Paragraph 9 of the complaint, R. 3, Vol, 1). The second
action was filed in September of 1974, alleging breaches of
the lease occurring prior to that date.
The alleged breaches in the unlawful detainer action,
basically stated, were that defendant had filed:

A copy of the lease agreement is attached as
Exhibit "A" to the plaintiff's brief. Although defendant
denies that that document is a true and correct copy of the
lease, it does appear that with respect to the portion of the
lease material to the issues here raised, it is the same as
the actual lease entered into by the parties and, therefore,
as a matter of convenience, reference will be made to that
document in this brief.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(a)

to properly maintain the theatre (although

a large amount of effort and money has been expended on theatre
maintenance and improvement, an amount in excess of $54,000
having been spent in 1974 alone - Defendant's Answers to
Interrogatories 9 and 10, R, 100-105; 127-129, Vol 2 ) ;
(b)

to expand the snack bar within the time

provided by the lease (although it is undisputed that this has
since been accomplished - Defendant's Answer to Interrogatory
17, R. 111-112, Vol. 2);
(c)

to move the theatre marquee, as required

by the lease (although the plaintiff, in violation of paragraph 31 of the lease, has not assisted in obtaining the zoning
changes necessary to make such a move possible - Defendant's
Answer to Interrogatory 17, R, 111, Vol. 2 ) ;
(d)

to pay the required rent (although it is

undisputed that all rental due was regularly and promptly
tendered and has now in fact been paid and accepted by
plaintiff - Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admissions,
R. 130-140, Vol, 2, and Affidavit of Edward Plitt, R. 75-78,
Vol. 1).
In addition, plaintiff took the position that defendant^ changing its name from ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc., and the alleged sale
of the stock of the defendant corporation by the former stockholder to the present stockholder, constituted an assignment
of the lease in breach thereof.
The complaint in the second suit reiterated the allegations of the unlawful detainer complaint and alleged one additional breach, i.e. that respondent had breached an implied
covenant of the lease to maximize the revenues from the leased
premises.
The following facts are admitted by plaintiff by its
responses to the defendants requests for admissions:
1.

Prior to June 26, 1974, plaintiff received,

accepted and retained the check of Plitt Intermountain Theatres,
Inc. (which plaintiff alleges to be an unauthorized assignee of
the lease), for rent for the period through July 31, 1974
(plaintiff*s response to request for admissions No. 1, R. 130-131,
Vol. 2 ) ;
2.

Prior to accepting this check, plaintiff had heard

"rumors" that ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc. was considering
a sale of its theatre operations (plaintiff1s response to
request for admissions No. 3, R. 131-132, Vol, 2 ) ;
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3.

Said check was retained until July 3, 1974 when

it was returned to defendant with a letter of plaintiff's
attorney setting forth various alleged breaches.(R. 132-133,
Vol. 2);
4.

Thereafter, for a period until December, 1974

plaintiff each month regularly returned the checks tendered
for rent.

(R. 132-133, Vol. 2 ) ;
5.

In December 1974 subsequent to plaintiff's send-

ing detailed notices of breach of the lease in July and August
1974, and subsequent to the filing of each of these cases (and,
therefore, with full knowledge of the alleged breaches of the
lease), plaintiff accepted all rental payments which it had
previously rejected.
6.

(R. 138, Vol. 2 ) ;

There was no agreement that by accepting rent

plaintiff was not waiving the breaches of the lease and there
is nothing in the record to support the contention of plaintiff
4
that acceptance of the rent was so conditioned.

^The only item in the record involved with these checks
is the letter of defendant's counsel sent to plaintiff's counsel,
when the latter had indicated his desire to again accept the
rent, stating "I am pleased that you see the error of your
ways, and as requested by you, I am returning herewith the
rent checks you previously delivered to me. The following
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7,

Plaintiff continued to accept regular rental

payments thereafter and defendant is current in payment of
rent.

(R. 138-140, Vol. 2 ) ,
The plaintiff having admitted the acceptance of rent,

and it being required that the breaches alleged in the complaint
must be taken as alleged for purposes of this appeal, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiff at the same time seeks both to forfeit
the lease and to collect damages because of the various breaches
which it alleges.

Plaintiff states three separate issues, but

there are really only two questions in issue on this appeal.
The main question centers on the effect of plaintiff's having
accepted rental payments with knowledge of the alleged breaches
checks of Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc. are enclosed:11
(R. 90, Vol. 2) If evidence outside the record were admitted,
it would show that plaintiff1s counsel conceded in the one
conversation when he requested repayment of the rent that by
accepting the checks the question of waiver was thereby raised
and it was at least waiving the asserted breach for the alleged
assignment of the lease. Defendant has not previously raised
this because it considers it improper to raise matters outside
the record, in the nature of simple conversation between counsel,
but in light of plaintifffs repeated assertions as to intentions
in accepting the rent, this point should be mentioned.
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for which it claims the right to forfeit the lease and also
to collect damages.

The basic issue presented for determinat-

ion by this court is whether by acceptance of rental payments
under the lease, with knowledge of the alleged breaches, the
lessor (plaintiff) waived those breaches.

Waiver of the breaches

would necessarily preclude utilization of the remedy of forfeiture.

Plaintiff bases its claim for damages upon what it

claims to be an implied obligation of the tenant to maximize
revenues from operation of the leased premises and this raises
the second issue, whether the tenant (defendant in this appeal)
had an obligation under the lease to maximize the revenues from
the leased premises.
These issues will be discussed in separate order.

I
BY ACCEPTANCE OF RENTAL PAYMENTS WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF THE BREACHES ALLEGED BY
PLAINTIFF, PLAINTIFF WAIVED THE BREACHES
The principle that by proper expressions or conduct a
landlord may waive his rights arising from breaches of a lease
by his tenant is universally recognized.

Plaintiff does not

appear to quarrel with this fundamental rule but attempts to
subvert that rule by insisting that whether a waiver exists is
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somehow a matter resting upon the subjective intention of the
landlord and suggests that the objective evidence of waiver,
that is the acceptance of rent, must be ignored.

That, however,

is not the law.
Acceptance of Rental Payments
Waives the Alleged Breaches
as a Matter of Law
The cases are legion, near unanimous, in holding that
the acceptance of rent with knowledge of breaches of the lease
constitutes as a matter of law a waiver of the alleged breaches.
Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 507 P. 2d
713 (1973);

Bailey v. Zlotnick, 133 F.2d 35 (B.C. App. 1942);

Re Hool Realty Company, 2 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1924); Wing, Inc. v.
Arnold, 107 S.2d 765 (Fla, 1959); Garbaczewski v. Vanucci
96 N,E,2d 653 (111. 1950); Bobb v. Frank L. Talbot Theatre
Company, 221 S,W. 372 (Mo. 1920); Plassmeyer v. Brenta, 94 A.2d
508 (N.J. 1953); Thaophilakos v. Costello, 54 S.W. 2d 203 (Tex.
1932); Fredeking v. Grimmett, 86 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1955);
Major v. Hall, 251 So.2d 444 (La. 1971); Four Seasons, Inc. v.
New Orleans Silversmith, Inc., 223 S.2d 686 (La. 1969); Edwards
Fine Furniture Inc. v. Ditullio, 252 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1948);
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Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1972); Larson v.
Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951); Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270
F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1959); Borst v. Ruff, 77 A.2d 343 (Conn.
1950); Sanders v. Satlive Bros. & Co., 174 N.W. 267 (Iowa,
1919); Guptill v, Macon Stone Supply Co., 79 S.E. 854 (Ga.
1913); Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361 (Cal.
1920; Snyder v. Hill, 45 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1951); Perry v.
Waddelow, 145 F.Supp. 349 (E.D. 111., 1956); Weiss v. Johnson,
190 N.E.2d 834 (111. 1963); Venters v. Reynolds, 354 S.W.2d
521 (Ky. 1962); Globe Leather & Shoe Fendings, Inc. v. Goldburgh,
159 N.E.2d 338 (Mass. 1959); Flying Service, Inc. v. Abitz,
386 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. 1965); Reno Realty & Investment Co. v.
Thornstein, 301 P.2d 1051 (Nev. 1956); Fairchild Realty v.
Spiegel, Inc., 98 S.E.2d 871 (N.C. 1957); Thomas Peebles &
Co. v. Sherman, 181 N.W. 715 (Minn. 1921); Port of Walla Walla
v. Sun Glo Producers, Inc., 504 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1912); Katz v.
Miller, 133 N.W. 1091 (Wis. 1912); Boiling v. King Coal Theaters,
41 S,E.2d 59 (Va. 1947); Amisano v. Shaw, 227 S.W.2d 951 (Ark.
1950); Butterfield v, Duquesne Mining Co., 182 P.2d 102 (Ariz.
1947).
These cases, representing 28 jurisdictions, are but
a few of the vast number of cases supporting this general rule.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Even where a lawsuit has been commenced based on the
breaches alleged by the landlord, this rule of waiver is applied
where rent is accepted after suit is commenced.

Bedford Invest-

ment Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1947); Jones v. Delia Maria,
191 P.943 (Cal. 1920); Guptill v. Macon Stone Supply Co.,
79 S.E.854 (Ga. 1913); Borst v. Ruff, 77 A.2d 343 (Conn.
1950); Fairchild Realty v. Spiegel, Inc., 98 S.E.2d 871 (N.C.
1957) . Indeed, even where rent was accepted by the landlord
in the midst of appeal, the rule has been applied.
Hill, 45 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1951).

Snyder v.

It is conceded that on this

point, one case cited by plaintiff, which although based on
different facts, can be interpreted as holding to the
contrary.
Typical of the cases holding that by the acceptance
of rent the landlord waives breaches of the lease, is Bedford
Investment Company v. Folb, 180 P,2d 361 (Cal. 1947), where the
lessee sublet the premises without the consent of the lessor.
Based on this breach an unlawful detainer action was commenced.
In the midst of the action the landlord accepted the payment
of rent.

Finding such acceptance to constitute a waiver

of the right to maintain the action, the court noted:
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"Respondent's acceptance of payment of the
rental after the action was filed bars the
right to forfeit the lease. The enforcement
of covenants for forfeiture are avoided
whenever possible. . . Since it is undisputed
that the rent was paid up to the date of trial,
the finding that respondent was entitled to
damages in the amount of the rental value of
$8.33 per day from May 31, 1946, and the judgment for that amount were contrary to the evidence and therefore erroneous. The payment of
rent obviously bars any judgment against
appellants for the rent and it likewise bars
a judgment either for damages or for possession."
Id. at 363. (Emphasis added).
The language in another California decision explains
well the basis for these decisions.

In Jones v. Delia Maria,

191 P.943 (Cal. 1920), the landlord sued to forfeit the lease
because of the tenant's failure to post: a bond required by the
lease.

While the suit was pending, the landlord accepted past

due rent.

In finding the acceptance to constitute a waiver,

the California court stated:
"The acceptance of such rent by plaintiff was
a waiver of defendant^ forfeiture of the
leasehold and of plaintiff*s right to maintain
this action." Id. at 943,
The court then explained:
"The right to recover possession in an
action such as this is based on the idea that
the tenant has forfeited his leasehold. Notwithstanding the breach by a lessee of any
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covenant that he may have made in the lease
contract, the lessor may or may not elect to
treat the breach as a forfeiture of the lease.
Here, by his notice to give the bond or redeliver possession, served November 11, 1917,
and by this action for restitution of possession and the cancellation of the lease, plaintiff
elected to treat the lease as forfeited. But
notwithstanding this election, he thereafter
could waive the forfeiture of the lease and his
right to insist thereon as a ground for restitution of possession and cancellation of the lease
contract. This plaintiff did by accepting rent
for months succeeding that in which he served upon
defendant the three days1 notice. Waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right, or
such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right - an election by one
to forego some advantage he could have taken or
insisted upon. A person who is in a position to
assert a right or insist upon an advantage may, by
his words or conduct, and without reference to any
act or conduct of the other party affected thereby, waive such right. Once such right is waived,
it is gone forever; the person who has waived the
right will thereafter be precluded from asserting
it. 'The courts, not favoring forfeitures, are
usually inclined to take hold of any circumstances
which indicate an election to waive a forfeiture1."
(Citation omitted). Id. at pages 943 to 944.

The Rule of Waiver is Applied
to all Breaches by the Tenant
In the court below, the plaintiff attempted to
draw a distinction between the results of a breach for improper
assignment (apparently conceding that acceptance of rent waived
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an improper assignment), and for other breaches by a lessee.
The cases apply no such distinction in holding that acceptance
of rent is a waiver of the breach.

The cases are clear that

the waiver extends to "breach of covenant or other wrongful
acts,f [Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943 at 946 (8th Cir.
1959)].

The cases cited involve waiver of breaches for failure

to pay rent; Guptill v. Macon Stone Supply Co., 140 Ga. 696,
79 S.E.854 (1913); improper assignment, Jensen v. 0. K.
Investment Company, 29 Utah 2d 231, 507 P.2d 713 (1973);
Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1920);
Major v. Hall, 251 So.2d 444 (La. 1971); failure to post
bond, Jones v. Delia Maria, 191 P.943 (Cal. 1920); failure
to pay taxes, Atkinson v. Trehan,

334 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1973);

Snyder v. Hill, 45 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1951); failure to build
buildings, Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1959);
improper use of the premises, Roseman v. Day, 345 Mass. 93
185 N.E.2d 650 (1962); and failure to repair, Larson v.
Sjogern, 226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951).

In Larson v. Sjogern,

the plaintiff attempted to forfeit a lease, alleging that
"the fences on the land were not kept in repair in violation
of the agreement in the lease and that the land was over-
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grazed, and that a reservoir was built on the land without
the consent of the lessor, and that this constituted waste11.
226 P.2d at 182. Drawing no distinction between the facts
presented by that case and any other waiver case, the Wyoming
court held that by acceptance of rent, the alleged breaches
had been waived.
Thus, the principle of waiver is universally applied
to any breach by the tenant.

The Subjective Intent of
the Plaintiff is Irrelevant
In the face of the overwhelming authority that the
acceptance of rent constitutes a waiver as a matter of law, the
plaintiff says that in spite of its actions in accepting the
rent, its subjective intention is controlling.

It being clear

that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law because of the admitted fact of plaintiff's inordinate
retention of a rent check in June and July 1974 prior to giving
notice of breach or filing suit and its later acceptance of
rent in December 1974 and thereafter, plaintiff attempts to
create out of whole cloth an issue of fact in an effort to
avoid summary judgment.
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The plaintiff now asserts that it accepted the rent
payments, Mas a gesture of good faith1' pursuant to terms of a
"tentative11 settlement agreement and acceptance of rent was
"a gesture of good faith".

Plaintiff contends that it did not

intend to waive the breaches when it accepted the rent (pages 9
and 10 of plaintiff's brief).

The labored explanation of this

contention is itself revealing, but it is also of paramount
importance that there is nothing whatever in the record to
support any such contention.

The only item in the record is

the letter of defendant's lawyer to plaintiff's lawyer dated
December 23, 1974, by which the checks were transmitted and
which states "I am pleased that you see the error of your
ways, and as you requested I am returning herewith the rent
checks you previously delivered to me.

The following checks

of Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Incf, are enclosed,,"

(R. 90,

Vol, 2 ) , This item alone shows that no such agreement or
understanding existed, but be that as it may, for purposes of
this appeal, the whole preposterous proposition is not relevant.
i

There was never even a "tentative" settlement agreement, but merely a proposal explored by counsel that counsel
agreed to present to their respective clients as a possibility
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<

for settling the case.

Also, as indicated in footnote 4

above, if the informal discussions between counsel are
somehow to be interjected (and it is submitted that to do so
would be grossly improper) the plaintiff must accept the
fact that its own counsel was aware that accepting the
rent raised the spectre of waiver, but nevertheless said
his client wanted the rent.
It is apparently plaintiff's contention that "the
question of appellant's intent" when it accepted the rent
is a factual question that prevents summary judgment.
However, the law is that the acceptance of rent by the plaintiff conclusively establishes a waiver.
ing of all of the cases on this point.
that a landlord announces:

This is the teachIt is very seldom

"By accepting the rent, I am

hereby waiving all breaches".

But the law says that certain

conduct, the acceptance of rent, is as conclusive as such an
announcement and precludes reliance on breaches occurring
before the rent is accepted.

Appellant simply cannot in

one breath forfeit the lease and in another take the rent.
It is significant that to this very day the plaintiff continues
to accept the rent.
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This legal principle is well expressed in the case
o f Miller v. Reidv. 260 P.358 (Cal. 1927), a case that plaintiff inappropriately cites in its own brief.

In that case,

the defendant lessee sublet the leased premises without the
consent of the lessor in violation of the lease agreement.
Immediately thereafter, the lessors took steps to bring
about a forfeiture of the lease.

Subsequent to that time,

however, the rental payments required by the lease were
paid and accepted.

Upon each such acceptance the lessor

executed a receipt stating that acceptance of rent was "without prejudice of any of my rights under the lease of said
premises11.

In upholding the trial court *s determination

that in spite of such a reservation by the lessor, he had
waived the breach of the lease by acceptance of rent, the
California Appellate Court states:
"This was a clear attempt to eat the cake
and still keep it. His actions belie his
words. Waiver is a question of intention.
(Citation omitted). For the lessors month
after month to accept rents specified in
the lease, and at the same time declare
that there was a forfeiture, results in
an irreconcilable inconsistency."
Id. at 360.
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It is clear, therefore, that regardless of what a
lessor's subjective intent may be, by his action of accepting
rent with knowledge of a breach, he is deemed to have waived
the breach.
Even if it is conceded, for purposes of the argument
here, that plaintiff did have the "good faith" intention on
which its argument here rests at the time it accepted the
several past rental checks in December 1974, how can that
immunize the plaintiff from waiver each month thereafter when
it accepts the rent?

Plaintiff certainly knew there was no

settlement when it served a massive set of written interrogatories on April 8, 1975 (R. 43-52, Vol. 2) and a request for
trial setting on April 28 (R. 58, Vol, 2) and discovery thereafter continued.

The fact that appellant continued to accept

the rent month after month firmly establishes its waiver of
the alleged breaches of the lease.
Not one persuasive authority is cited by plaintiff in
support of this main portion of its argument about its subtle
subjective intention to take the rent and forfeit the lease.
In the face of a very substantial body of law, plaintiff
presents a handful of readily distinguishable and inapposite
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cases and lamely cites two cases (perhaps for inapplicable
dicta) the holdings of which are directly to the contrary of
the proposition for which they are cited.
The case chiefly relied upon by the plaintiff
acknowledges that the waiver need not be expressed in words
and further states that a clear act of the party is sufficient to constitute a waiver and that it is not necessary
that there be an express waiver.

Lucas Hunt Village Co. v.

Klein, 218 S.E.2d 595 (Mo. 1949),

This case is factually

inapposite and does not run counter to the plethora of authority
cited above.

In that case the lessor's bookkeeper, who

handled 606 rent accounts, inadvertently accepted one month's
rent after the lessee had breached the lease.

As soon as

the mistake was discovered, no further payments were accepted.
There was in that case no evidence of "knowing" acceptance of
rent,

In the case here before the court, however, there is

not, nor can there be, any claim of inadvertence or mistake
by the plaintiff.
Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, although cited
by plaintiff, does not support its position, as the holding
in that case is squarely against that position.
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The same is

true of Miller v, Reidy, 260 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1927).
In Re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.
1938), cited by plaintiff, is also inapplicable.

The decision

of the court in that case was governed by a specific provision
in the lease whereby the parties had agreed that:
11

, , .the receipt of rent with knowledge of
any breach shall not be deemed to be a waiver
as to any breach of any covenant or condition
herein contained." Id. at 308.
There is no such provision in this lease nor any other agreement
to that effect,
B.J,M, Realty Corporation v. Ruggieri, 326 F.2d 281
(2d Cir. 1964) relied upon by plaintiff, is also readily distinguishable.

At the time that case was heard, the lessee had

filed for bankruptcy and because of a bankruptcy rule that
payments made by a bankrupt to a lessor could not be considered
to be "rent" until the court had given its permission to affirm
the lease, an issue entirely different from the present one
controlled the case.

The issue in the B.J.M. Realty Corporation

case was whether an acceptance of "rent" had taken place.

That

issue is expressed in the following language from that opinion:
"In order to prevail, the trustee must prove
that the landlord accepted fas rent1 the payments made to him by the debtor after the landlord
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had learned that the forfeiture provision
of the lease had been breached."
Id. at 283,
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the payments made to the plaintiff were rent under the terms of the
lease and the B.J.M. Realty Corporation case, therefore, has
no application.
Plaintiff's attempted reliance on Merkowitz v.
Mahoney, 215 P.2d 317 (Colo. 1949) is likewise misplaced.
In that case, unlike the present case, many of the breaches
relied upon by the landlord in his action for forfeiture
occurred after his acceptance of rent had ceased.

As stated

on pages 319-320 of that decision:
"It next is contended under the heading of
'waiver and estoppel' that the acceptance
of rent accruing after the cause of forfeiture, with knowledge of such cause, is a
waiver of the right of forfeiture. Again
assuming that this is a correct statement
of applicable law and assuming that it would
in fact bar the termination of the lease
upon the other grounds alleged, which we do
not deem it necessary to discuss, still the
record discloses that the last rental received
by the plaintiff was in August 1947, and
there is substantial evidence of repeated
and regular violation of the lease . . . and
subsequent breaches were not waived by receipt
of rent."
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Furthermore, those amounts of rent which were paid
during the pendency of the Merkowitz case were paid to the
clerk of the court, rather than to the plaintiff (p. 320).
With respect to the effect of that arrangement upon the waiver
issue, the court stated:
"The very fact that the payments were made
from month to month to, and accepted by,
the court in which the action was pending
without dismissal of the action would
establish conclusively that they were made
either by stipulation or by order of court
as in lieu of bond for the protection of
the landlord pending the litigation, and
not as an intended waiver of default and
recognition of the continuance of the
lease/1 Id. at 321.
Although because of the special circumstances present
in the Merkowitz case, the general rule regarding waiver
through the acceptance of rent was not applicable, the court
nevertheless reaffirmed that rule.

On page 320 it stated:

"It is the general rule that any act done
by a landlord, with knowledge of an existing right of forfeiture, which recognizes
the existence of the lease is a waiver of
the right to enforce the forfeiture . . .
where a landlord after violation of the
lease has his election to declare the lease
at an end or to permit it to continue, the
acceptance of rent due thereafter is usually
held to constitute an election to waive the
forfeiture, and, having made his election,
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the landlord cannot thereafter rely on
the past default as ground of terminating the lease."
Wecht v. Anderson, 444 P.2d 501 (Nev. 1968) and
Myers v. Herskowitz, 165 P.1031 (Cal. 1917), cited by plaintiff,
are similarly distinguishable.

In those cases, as in Merkowitz,

the breaches alleged by the plaintiff as the grounds for those
suits took place after the acceptance of rent had ceased.
Moreover, in Myers, to avoid waiving the lessee's forfeiture,
the lessor refused to accept the rent.

In an attempt to

circumvent this action, the lessee deposited the amount of the
rent in the lessor's bank account.

For obvious reasons, the

court found such action not to constitute a waiver.
The Law Abhors a Forfeiture
It is universally recognized that forfeitures are
not favored by the law and waivers of the right to declare a
forfeiture will be readily found.

In Larson v. Sjogern,

226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951), the Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
"Forfeitures are not favored, since that
is a harsh method by which to deprive a
party of his rights . . . Such forfeiture
may be waived and since it is not favored,
slight circumstances will at times suffice
to constitute a waiver. Thus it is stated
in 32 Am. Juris. 747:
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'Generally speaking, any recognition by
the lessor of a tenancy as subsisting after a
right of entry has accrued, where the lessor
has notice of the forfeiture, will have the
effect of a waiver of the landlord's right
to a forfeiture of the leasehold. Slight
acts on the part of the lessor may be sufficient. Indeed, it has been ruled that any
act on the part of the lessor, by word or
deed, with knowledge of what has been done,
which signifies his intention to affirm the
lease, is conclusive evidence of a waiver
of the forfeiture.1 . . . Thus, too, the
payment and acceptance of rent, after breach,
with knowledge thereof as is true in this
case, will ordinarily waive the causes for
forfeiture.!f Id. at 182 to 183.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.
1959), stated:
"We approach the problem mindful of the
universally recognized principle of law
that forfeiture, which is the right of a
landlord to terminate a lease because of
the lessee's breach of covenant or other
wrongful act, is not favored by the courts."
Id. at 946.
Other courts have used stronger language in expressing this rule.

In Duncan v. Malcomb, 351 S,W.2d 419, 420

(Ark. 1961), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:

"Of course,

it is elementary that equity abhors forfeitures".
California court stated in Churchill v. Kellstrom,
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The

136 P.2d 602, 605 (Cal. 1943), "Both in law and in equity
forfeitures are abhorred but by the same token waivers are
favored."
Because of the disfavored status of forfeitures,
waivers are readily found and even slight acts on the part
of the lessor will constitute a waiver of lease violation.
For example, in Borst v. Ruff, 77 Atlantic 2d 343 (Conn. 1950),
two checks tendered by the lessee were dishonored for insufficient funds.
commenced.

A notice to quit was served and an action

While the action was pending, several checks were

tendered by the tenants.
never cashed.

These checks were accepted but

At trial the court held that merely retaining

these checks without cashing them constituted a waiver of
the right to declare a forfeiture, and that finding was upheld
by the Connecticut court, which stated:
"Such acceptance by the landlord renewed
the tenancy and waived the default."
Id. at 344.
Thus, in this case, the mere retention (prior to the filing of
these suits by plaintiff) from prior to June 26 until July 3
(R. 130-133, Vol. 2) by Woodland of the defendant's check
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tendered in June 1974 for rent for July 1974 was sufficient
to constitute a waiver.
This general rule disfavoring forfeitures has been
adopted by this court.

In Peterson v, Hodges, 121 Utah 72,

239 P.2d 180 (1951), a case involving the attempted forfeiture
of a lease of real property, this court stated:
"Forfeitures are not favored. Even
contracts which expressly provide for
a forfeiture will not be extended beyond
the strict and literal meaning of the
language used.11 Id. at 184.
Under established case law, it is evident that even
by slight acts indicating an affirmance of the lease, a landlord waives any breach by the tenant.
In an admittedly different but analogous factual
situation dealing with a vendor's attempt to forfeit an
installment land contract, the rule was also recognized by
this court.

In Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Invest-

ment Company. 3 U.2d 121, 299 P.2d 709 (1955), this Court
stated:
"It is fundamental that a vendor cannot
claim a forfeiture and at the same time
receive the purchase money. [Citation
omitted]. A vendor by receiving money
when past due is precluded from availing
himself of any right of forfeiture which
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has arisen because of the failure to
pay one installment on time. The crossappellant objects that the formal elements
of waiver are not present in this instance
and that the defendant did not: detrimentally
change its position in reliance upon the
action of the sellers in accepting its
payments late. The proposition that defendant would order its bank to pay $254.85
a gratuity to its vendors, who are attempting to declare forfeiture, is indeed open
to doubt; but whether we regard the sellers1
action as a waiver or as an election to
disregard the breach and continue the
contract, the act of accepting payments under
the contract is unequivocal in its legal effect.
As we said in Kohler v. Lundberg, 54 U.339,
180 P.590, 592: 'Courts of equity are loth
to enforce a forfeiture, especially when a
refusal to do so, as in this case, gives to
all parties to the agreement every right to
which they are entitled, and thus in no way
works a hardship upon anyone'." Id. at
710-711.
The Swain case presents another reason for affirming
the judgment here.

As in that case, the refusal to enforce

a forfeiture of the lease, will give the parties here every
right to which they are entitled, and thus no hardship will
be imposed on anyone.

The plaintiff has received and continues

to receive all of the rent (both the fixed minimum and percentage rent) to which it is entitled under the lease.

The

defendant, on the other hand, has expended much effort and
money (in excess of $54,000 in 1974 alone, the year in question

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in this case) in repairing, maintaining and improving the
theatre premises (R. 100-105; 127-129, Vol. 2) and it would
work a substantial hardship on defendant to lose the benefit
of such efforts and expenditures.

Furthermore, any breaches

which plaintiff contends to have occurred have all been
corrected (R. 100-116, Vol. 2).

II
THE DEFENDANT HAD NO DUTY TO
MAXIMIZE REVENUES AND PLAINTIFF
HAS NO PROPER CLAIM FOR RELIEF
The case first filed by plaintiff sought to forfeit
the lease under the unlawful detainer statute (R. 1-5, Vol. 1 ) .
Several weeks later, apparently as an afterthought, another
complaint was filed (R. 2-23, Vol. 2). The second complaint
was virtually the same as the first, except that it sought
large damages.

The basis for this damage claim was a new

allegation to the effect that the defendant, as a tenant under
a so-called "percentage leaseff has an implied obligation to
maximize revenues earned from the leased premises and that the
defendant, because of the breaches of the lease previously
alleged, had not maximized revenues and had, therefore, breached
this obligation.

Also, in its brief here, in an effort to

avoid the mandate of the authorities suggested above, plaintiff
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obliquely suggests that acceptance of rent does not waive
"material breaches of a lease agreement".
plaintiff's brief).

(Page 16-18

This latter point will be discussed

first.

Acceptance of Rent Waives
All Existing Breaches
Plaintiff, by ignoring the very substantial
authority to the effect that acceptance of rent waives
a forfeiture (this point having been fully argued in the
court below), appears to concede that it has no right to
forfeit the lease and that at least to that extent the
summary judgment is correct.

In a rather weak effort to

avoid the full impact of its waiver, however, the plaintiff
suggests that somehow the breaches may be subsisting for
purposes other than forfeiture.
The authorities dealing with the question of waiver
through the knowing acceptance of rent, including those cited
under Point I above, do not draw a distinction between the
waiver of forfeiture and the waiver of other remedies, it
being generally stated that the knowing acceptance of rent
waives a'breach of the lease.

(See cases cited underPoint I
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above) . In the trial court the thrust of this part of
plaintiff's argument was to the effect that the rule of
waiver applied only to certain types of breaches and that
it did not extend to breaches of covenants to repair and
maintain the premises.

The argument appears to be abandoned,

but, as discussed above at page 13, it must be emphasized here
that the rule of waiver is applied, regardless of the type
of breach or whether the remedy sought for such breach is
forfeiture or damages or both.
As stated in Bedford Investment Company v. Folb,
180 P. 2d 361 (Cal. 1947), discussed in detail under Point I:
"The payment of rent obviously bars any
judgment against appellants for the rent
and it likewise bars a judgment either for
damages or for possession.11 Id. at 363.
(Emphasis added).
Plaintiff cites several cases on pages 16 to 18
of its brief in a feeble attempt to support its position on
this issue.

However, careful review of those cases reveals

that they do not support plaintiff's contention.

For example,

Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S,2d 293 (1972), does not acknowledge
a landlord's right to sue for damages despite a waiver of
the right to terminate the lease.

Although in its decision,
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the word damages was used, in essence the court simply stated
that the lessor had the right to enforce a provision in the
lease requiring the lessee to pay taxes for the period it was
actually in possession.

This is consistent with respondent's

position, as it is not contended that by accepting rent appellant has waived its right to require such payments.

On the

contrary, the acceptance of rent is considered to be a reaffirmation of the lease.
Klein v. Long, 34 A.2d 359 (Mun. Ct. of Appeals,
D.C., 1943) deals with the commission of waste on the leased
premises, an issue not raised in the present case.

In that

case, due to the very substantial detrimental and permanent
modification of the premises by the tenant, the court found
the tenant guilty of "waste".
this case, nor could it be.

No claim of waste is made in

Waste is a term of art in real

property law and has no application in this case.
As is evident from the previous discussion under
Point I of the Wecht decision, the remaining case cited by
appellant, it also does not support appellant's position.
Through the knowing acceptance of rent, appellant
waived the alleged breaches, including any claims it: may have
had for damages,
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There is No Implied
Covenant to Maximize Revenues
Plaintiff's claim for damages is bottomed on its
allegation that there is an implied covenant under a percentage lease that the tenant will operate the business on the
premises in a manner to maximize revenues and thereby
maximize the amount of percentage rent earned by the lessor.
This contention that there is such an implied covenant in
the lease is added to the allegations in the second complaint,
which are otherwise the same as those in the first complaint
by paragraphs 13, 14 and 15, which read in relevant part
as follows:
"13. Pursuant to the provision of the
lease and in accordance with the intent
of the parties that Woodland receive part of
its compensation from a percentage of the
gross receipts above the minimum guaranteed
annual lease payments provided for in the
lease, defendants were obliged to . . .
operate the theatre in a prudent, diligent
and businesslike manner and to acquire the
finest available motion picture products
suitable for display at the theatre so as to
maximize the revenue therefrom such that
Woodland would receive the benefit of the
gross proceeds which would result from such
prudent, diligent, and businesslike
operation of the theatre.
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"14. That defendants breached their
obligation under the lease . . . and
failed to operate the theatre in a
prudent, diligent and businesslike
manner and failed to acquire the finest
available motion picture products
suitable for display at the theatre, and
therefore, failed to maximize the revenue
therefrom.
"15. That as a result of defendant's
breaches . . , Woodland has been damaged
by reason of . . . loss of revenue from
the percentage of gross revenue to which
it is entitled and which it would have
received . . ."
An examination of the relevant provisions of the
lease and the authorities in this area reveals that no
such implied covenant exists.
Paragraph 2 of the lease agreement provides for the
payment of a substantial guaranteed annual rental of $32,500,
In addition, it provides for the payment to the lessor of:
ff

A. Fifteen per cent (15%) of the gross
admission receipts, if any, of the theatre
in excess of One Hundred Eighty-Three
Thousand Three Hundred and Thirty Three
Dollars ($183,333.00), and
lf

B. Fifteen percent (15%) of the gross
concession receipts, if: any, of the
theatre in excess of Sixty Five Thousand
Dollars ($65,000).
"The gross admission receipts and gross
concession receipts of the theatre upon
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determination of the percentage rental,
if any, due under this lease are to be
computed, shall be calculated at the end
of each year of the term of this lease
and the amount of percentage rental,
if any, due the Lessor as percentage
rental shall be paid by the Lessee without demand no later than thirty (30)
days after the end of each such lease
year." (Emphasis added).
Paragraph 2 also states:
"The Lessee in no way guarantees that
there shall be any percentage rental
earned and due and payable under the
terms and conditions of this lease.
(Emphasis added).
It is abundantly clear from the provisions of the
lease that the respondent lessee was under no duty to see
that sufficient revenues were realized from the leased premises
to insure the payment of any percentage rental, let alone a
maximum percentage rental as appellant suggests.

The language

of the lease, therefore, contradicts the allegations in the
complaint.
Even without this language, the cases establish
that there is no duty to maximize revenues.

In fact, it is

generally held that where a percentage lease provides for the
payment of a minimum guaranteed rental which is not merely
nominal, the payment of the minimum rental completely fulfills
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the lessee's rental obligations under the lease. Anyadditional rental is considered as merely a bonus to the
lessor.

Furthermore, the cases generally hold that not

only is the lessee under no obligation to maximize the
lessorfs percentage rental, but as long as he pays the
minimum rental, he has no obligation even to continue to
do business on the premises.

Masciotra v. Harlow, 105 Cal.

App. 2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951); Percoff v. Solomon, 259
Ala. 482, 67 So.2d 31 (1953); Cousins Investment Co. v.
Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal, App. 2d 141, 113 P.2d 878
(1941); Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J. Super.
477, 98 A.2d 121 (1953); Monte Corp. v. Stephens, 324 P.2d
538 (Okla. 1958); Wheil v. N. Lewis Shops, Inc., 281 S.W.
2d 651 (Tex. 1955); Palm V. Mortgage Investment Co. of El
Paso, 229 S.W. 2d 869 (Tex, 1950);Stern v, Dunlap, 228
F,2d 939 (10th Cir. 1955).
Stern v. Dunlap Co,, supra, is representative of
the cases in this area.

Although that case arose out of

New Mexico, the opinion is not based upon the law of any
particular jurisdiction.

In that case the plaintiffs owned

a store building in Las Cruces, New Mexico, in which they had
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for many years conducted a drygoods mercentile business.
In 1946, plaintiffs conveyed the stock of merchandise
and leased the premises to the tenant under a percentage
lease with a guaranteed minimum rental of $350 per month.
The lease also provided that the lessee would keep the premises in good repair and that it would remodel the store
front at its own expense.

Defendant operated the business

in substantially the same manner as it had been operated
by the plaintiff until 1958.

In that year, defendant opened

another store in the same city,

By changing the leased store

to a "bargain center11, while shifting the high quality line
of merchandise to the new store, and by juggling the names,
promotional budgets, charge accounts, and other items between
the two stores, the defendant was able to shift much of the
business and good will of the leased premises to its new
store.

As a result, the gross sales of the leased store and

the percentage rental paid to the plaintiff dropped substantially.

The plaintiff claimed that defendant had thereby breached

an implied covenant.

The trial court withdrew from the jury

the issues relating to rental and to injury or damage to the
reputation of the premises, finding that no implied covenant
existed.

In sustaining this action, the Tenth Circuit said:
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11

. . . In its major aspect the cause of
action by the appellants was in substance
an asserted past and continuing breach of
covenant to conduct on the leased premises
during the entire term of the lease a mercantile
store dealing in the sale of high class merchandise similar in quality to that previously
carried in stock by the appellants. It was
implicit in the lease agreement that the parties
contemplated that the appellee would use the
premises for the conduct of a mercantile business.
But the lease did not contain any provision that
the appellee would conduct on the premises a
business dealing in the sale of high class
merchandise similar in quality to that previously handled and sold thereon by the appellants.
The lease was completely silent in that respect.
But the appellants relied on an implied covenant
obligating the appellant to conduct on the
premises the business of that kind . . . The
provision in respect to rental was clear. The
monthly payment of $350.00 rental represented a
substantial rental, not a mere nominal sum. A
further sum was to be paid annually, based upon
a percentage gross sales. And rental was paid
in strict accord with such terms of the agreement.
We are clear in the view that the changing of
the nature of the business conducted on the leased
premises did not constitute a breach of an implied
covenant [of] the lease with resulting wrongful
invasion of the rights of the appellants in
respect to rental.11 (Citations omitted).
Id, at 942 and 943.
Thus, even where the lessee has taken affirmative
action to reduce the lessor?s percentage rental, there is no
implied covenant on the part of the lessee to maximize rents
nor is there a breach of any rental covenant.
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In the present

case, plaintiff did not allege any intentional reduction of
revenues, but its only contention was that respondent could
conceivably have generated more revenue than it did.
In Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corporation,
377 Pa. 549, 105 A.2d 580 (1954), the Pennsylvania court
sustained the granting of a demurrer to the complaint, holding
that there is no implied covenant to continue the business or
maximize revenue.

Explaining the tremendous practical problems

which a court would face if it were to find such an implied
covenant, the court stated:
ff

If an implied covenant, as claimed by
plaintiff, should be held to arise in such cases
what would be the extent of the restriction
thereby imposed on the lessee? Would it extend
to each and every act on his part that might
serve to reduce the extent of his business and
thereby the percentage rental based thereon?
Would it forbid him, for example, if operating
a retail store, from keeping it open for a fewer
number of hours each day than formerly? Would
it forbid him from dismissing salesmen whereby
his business might be reduced in volume? Would
it forbid him from discontinuing any department of his business even though he found it
to be operating at a loss? It would obviously
be quite unreasonable and wholly undesirable
to imply an obligation that would necessarily
be vague, uncertain and generally impracticable/1
Id. at 582.
The reluctance of the courts to allow the lessor
to meddle in the lessee-s affairs and to second guess his
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business decisions has been a substantial factor influencing
their refusal to find an implied covenant in percentage
leases requiring the lessee to maximize revenue.
In refusing to find an implied covenant, the
decisions also rely on the general rule that implied
covenants are not favored by the law and will not be implied
where the language of the lease is clear.
followed in Utah.

This rule has been

Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 U.2d 163,

321 P. 2d 221 (1958); and Flowers v. Wrights, Inc., 227 P.2d
768, 119 Utah 378 (1951), (two cases dealing with percentage
leases).

In the Ephraim Theatre Co. case, the literal terms

of a theatre lease did not provide any minimum monthly rental,
but provided for the lessor to be compensated by receiving
a portion of the profits.

When the business proved to be

unprofitable, the lessor brought an action for rent, claiming
that in the interest of fairness, the contract should be so
construed as to impose upon the defendant an obligation to
pay a fixed monthly rental.

In refusing to read such an

implied obligation into the lease agreement, this court
stated:
"It would defeat the very purpose of formal
contracts to permit a party to invoke the
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use of words or conduct inconsistent
with its terms to prove that the parties
did not mean what they said, or to use such
inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate
uncertainty or ambiguity where none would
otherwise exist. Generally speaking, neither
of the parties, nor the court has any right
to ignore or modify the conditions which
are clearly expressed merely because it may
subject one of the parties to hardship, but
they must be enforced fin accordance with
the intention as . . . manifested by the
language used by the parties to the contract'."
Id, at 223.
In the Flowers case, this court again emphasized
that:
"While we must enforce the lease in accordance with the intent of the parties, we
must find that intent from the language of
the lease itself, especially when it is
clearly expressed." Id, at 771.
Although plaintiff on page 20 of its brief attempts
to create a factual issue by claiming that parole evidence
should be considered in interpreting the lease, and that an
implied covenant should be read into it, extraneous evidence
must not be considered, unless the lease is ambiguous,

In

the present case, the language of the lease is clear, as it
provides "The lessee in no way guarantees that there shall be
any percentage rental earned and due and payable under the
terms and conditions of this lease".

There is, therefore,
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no basis for plaintiff's assertion that parole evidence should
be considered and an implied covenant to maximize revenues
from the leased premises should be read into the lease.
Plaintiff's attempted reliance on Flowers on pages
21 to 23 of its brief reveals the weakness of its position
on this question.

The issue of whether there exists an

implied covenant to maximize revenues under a percentage
lease was never considered in that case.

The sole question

was whether a lessee under a percentage lease must account
to his lessor for revenues received from a sublessee.

The

issues presented by this case and the Flowers case are,
therefore, entirely different and that decision has no
application to the present question.
Plaintiff's citation of the dicta from the Flowers
decision dealing with a lessor's remedies where he had been
intentionally deprived of rent is likewise without application
to the present issue,

There is no allegation whatsoever that

respondent has intentionally reduced the theatre revenues and,
in fact, it would be preposterous to suggest that respondent
would intentionally deprive itself of 85 per cent of the
revenues in order to avoid the payment to appellant of
15 per cent.
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Cessna Loan Company v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270
P.1022 (1928), cited by plaintiff, is also inapplicable.

In

that case the landlord was not seeking damages or forfeiture
due to the tenant's alleged breach as in this case, but was
merely seeking to recover a percentage of the revenues realized
by the tenant from departments of the business which had been
moved from the leased premises to an adjoining building.

The

Washington Supreme Court made it clear that that particular
issue was the only one under consideration as it stated "We
do not decide any issue other than that squarely presented in
this case".

Id at 1024,

That issue is not present in this

case and consequently, the Cessna Loan case is not applicable.
Plaintiff's citation of Williston on Contracts,
Revised Edition, Vol, 1, Section 104A, at page 357, on page 16
of its memorandum, is another indication of the weakness of
plaintiffls position,

That citation is taken from a section

entitled "Consideration in Bilateral 'Requirement* and 'Output1
Contracts",

The cited statement makes no reference whatso-

ever to the maximization of profits under percentage leases,
or even to leases,
The case of State Auto & Casualty Underwriters v,
Salisbury, 27 U,2d 204 (1972), 494 P.2d 529, likewise has no
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application to the case at bar.

That case dealt solely with

an agent's duties to his principal.
Unlike the present case, the lease in Mayfair
Operating Corporation v. Vessemer Properties, Inc., 7 S.2d
342 (Fla. 1942), contained an express provision requiring
the lessee to "use its best efforts to obtain and maintain
the highest volume of business on the premises".

Id. at 342,

The parties in Selber Brothers, Inc. v. Newstadt's
Shoe Stores, 194 S.579 (La. 1940), had through three successive lease agreements, established a well-settled course of
dealing with one another.

There is no such course of dealing

here involved, and in this case the defendant took over a
failing operation from a court-appointed receiver (R. 338339, Vol. 2 ) , expressly provided in the lease there was no
assurance that rental would be paid in excess of the minimum
amount (R, 11, Vol, 1), and it is stretching to the utmost
to say that plaintiff here has a right: to damages.

Moreover,

in the Selber case,
" . . . the defendant made a drastic change
in the use of the premises, more than four
months before the expiration of the lease, and
thereby willfully lessened the rental value
of the place as a first-class shoe store, in
order to divert the business to the new location
which the defendant had rented more than four
months before the expiration of this lease.11
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Even if the Selber case were interpreted as plaintiff
contends it should be, it is squarely against the overwhelmingly large number of cases holding to the contrary.
In this case, it is not contended that defendant
has drastically changed the use of the premises, that it has
willfully reduced the revenues therefrom, or that it has
attempted to divert business from the leased premises to
another theatre.

In fact, the defendant does not operate

any other drive-in theatre in the area and has no drive-in
theatre to which it could divert revenues.

It is undisputed

that the respondent has continued to operate the theatre on
a continual year-round basis, with plaintiff's contention
being that respondent could conceivably have realized more
revenues from the operation of the theatre.
Both the authorities and the provisions of the
lease itself make it clear that there is no basis for plaintiff's
assertion that an implied covenant to maximize revenues
from the leased premises should be read into the lease.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
By accepting rental payments under the lease,
plaintiff waived the asserted breaches.

Since both actions
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filed by plaintiff were based on the alleged breaches,
there is no longer any basis for the claims.

In addition,

defendant lessee had no obligation under the lease to
maximize revenues,
It is respectfully submitted that the summary
judgment should be affirmed.
DATED this0^7^

day of August, 1976.
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